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Synaptic plasticity is widely considered to be the neurobiological basis of learning and
memory by neuroscientists and researchers in adjacent fields, though diverging opinions
are increasingly being recognized. From the perspective of what we might call “classical
cognitive science” it has always been understood that the mind/brain is to be considered
a computational-representational system. Proponents of the information-processing
approach to cognitive science have long been critical of connectionist or network
approaches to (neuro-)cognitive architecture, pointing to the shortcomings of the
associative psychology that underlies Hebbian learning as well as to the fact that
synapses are practically unfit to implement symbols. Recent work on memory has been
adding fuel to the fire and current findings in neuroscience now provide first tentative
neurobiological evidence for the cognitive scientists’ doubts about the synapse as
the (sole) locus of memory in the brain. This paper briefly considers the history and
appeal of synaptic plasticity as a memory mechanism, followed by a summary of the
cognitive scientists’ objections regarding these assertions. Next, a variety of tentative
neuroscientific evidence that appears to substantiate questioning the idea of the synapse
as the locus of memory is presented. On this basis, a novel way of thinking about the
role of synaptic plasticity in learning and memory is proposed.
Keywords: synaptic plasticity, memory, learning, memory mechanisms, long-term potentiation, hebbian learning,
synaptic turnover, cognitive science
1. INTRODUCTION
Synaptic plasticity is widely considered to provide the neurobiological basis of learning and
memory by neuroscientists and researchers in adjacent fields. However, diverging opinions are
increasingly being recognized (e.g., Dudai et al., 2015; Poo et al., 2016).
Within what we might call “classical cognitive science” (Piattelli-Palmarini, 2001) it has always
been understood that the mind/brain is to be considered a computational-representational system.
Yet, not all cognitive scientists have ever (fully) agreed with this assessment (e.g., Rumelhart
et al., 1986). Actually, as of today, large parts of the field have concluded, primarily drawing
on work in neuroscience, that neither symbolism nor computationalism are tenable and, as a
consequence, have turned elsewhere. In contrast, classical cognitive scientists have always been
critical of connectionist or network approaches to cognitive architecture (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn,
1988), and recent work on memory (e.g., Gallistel and King, 2009; Gallistel and Matzel, 2013;
Gallistel and Balsam, 2014) has been adding fuel to the fire. Recent work in neuroscience
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(Chen et al., 2014; Johansson et al., 2014; Ryan et al., 2015)
has now provided first tentative neurobiological evidence for the
cognitive scientists’ doubts about the synapse as the locus of
memory in the brain.
This paper briefly considers the history and appeal of synaptic
plasticity as a memory mechanism, followed by a summary of
the cognitive scientists’ objections to this idea. Next, a variety of
tentative neuroscientific evidence that appears to substantiates
questioning the idea of the synapse as the locus of memory is
considered. On this basis, a novel way of thinking about the
role of synaptic plasticity in learning and memory—mentioned
only in passing in a recent commentary (Trettenbrein, 2015)—is
proposed.
2. A TENTATIVE IDEA WITH AN INTUITIVE
APPEAL
It was Ramón y Cajal who first concluded from his studies of
bird brains that neurons touch one another yet remain separate
entities; Sherrington later coined the term “synapse” to refer to
the microscopic gap between individual nerve cells (Glickstein,
2014). Subsequently, the psychologist Donald Hebb made the
at first merely theoretical proposal that changes in synaptic
connectivity and strength might constitute the fundamental
mechanism for information storage in the brain. It it interesting
to note that Ramón y Cajal had, in a way, anticipated this
conceptual move when he noted that “[. . . ] interneuronal
connectivity [. . . ] is susceptible to being influenced and modified
during youthful years by education and habits” (Delgado-García,
2015, p. 6). As of today, the general idea that learning is essentially
the modification of synapses in an ever-changing plastic brain
(a problematic notion; see Delgado-García and Gruart, 2004;
Delgado-García, 2015) has become one of the dogmas of modern
neuroscience and is usually presented in popular science as well
as in the scientific literature proper as an established fact and
“generally accepted” (Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2007).
The fundamental principle of Hebb’s ideas on learning and
memory was later poignantly summarized by Shatz as “[. . . ] cells
that fire together wire together” (Shatz, 1992). Hebb himself more
elaborately suggested that
[w]hen an axon of cell A is near enough to excite cell B and
repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth
process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such
that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased. (Hebb
as cited in Glickstein, 2014, p. 253)
While these ideas about synaptic plasticity originally were
purely theoretical in nature they have long-since been confirmed
experimentally with the discovery of long-term potentiation
(LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) as complementary
neurobiological mechanisms.
In this context, it is important to point out the crucial role
that (cognitive) psychology and its philosophical predecessors
have played in this overall development. Not only was Hebb
himself an early neuropsychologist trained by Karl Lashley, his
idea that learning occurs whenever two cells fire together is
clearly reminiscent of Lockean associative psychology which, in
turn, can be traced back in the history of ideas all the way to
Aristotle. This associative aspect of Hebbian learning has an
intuitive appeal, as Gallistel and King (2009) recount tongue-in-
cheek: How else could you explain that if you hear “salt” you
will probably also think “pepper?” Associationism has come in
different flavors since the days of Skinner, but they all share
the fundamental aversion toward internally adding structure to
contingencies in the world (Gallistel andMatzel, 2013). Crucially,
it is only against this background of association learning that
LTP and LTD seem to provide a neurobiologically as well as
psychologically plausible mechanism for learning and memory.
3. WHY NOT (ONLY) THE SYNAPSE?
If learning actually is the association of ideas in the Lockean
sense, then everything is fine and LTP and LTD provide
mechanisms that enable brains to carry forward information
in time. However, as the proponents of a computational-
representational view of the mind/brain have been arguing
almost since the inception of cognitive science against the
backdrop of behaviorism in the 1950s, learning is not association.
In similar fashion, Gallistel and collaborators (Gallistel and King,
2009; Gallistel and Matzel, 2013) have in recent years been
pointing to this conceptual flaw with regard to how learning
and memory are understood in neuroscience and other cognitive
sciences, convincingly arguing that indeed not even the most
fundamental properties of associative learning can be accounted
for by LTP and LTD.
Pavlov himself already knew that the associative strength
between two stimuli is determined by amultitude of experimental
aspects in combination (Gallistel and King, 2009), meaning that
all the different variables are encoded in a single association. In
order to read information from memory it would be necessary
to know about the mapping rules employed when writing that
information to memory. However, in such a scenario where a
variety of different variables have been mixed and encoded in a
single association it is mathematically impossible to determine
the value of any of the variables that entered into the original
calculation: Mathematically speaking, association is a many-one
function so that Pavlov’s goal of discovering general “laws of
association” cannot be met. Instead, in order to regain useful
information from associative strengths, it is necessary to assume
that there are different mapping rules (i.e., neurobiological
processes) for every synapse. It stands to reason that this is an
unpleasant assumption which runs counter to Pavlov’s intent.
Furthermore, Hebbian learning rests on the idea that the
neuron is the basic unit of information processing in the brain
only by virtue of its connectivity profile, meaning that strength
and patterns of synaptic connections constitute the way in which
information is represented and stored in the brain. However,
there is no a priori reason why this should be the case and
while the vast majority of work in cognitive neuroscience of
course relies on imaging or (indirectly) recording from entire
populations of neurons if not functional modules or systems, we
need not and should not assume that information processing in
the brain stops at the cellular level.
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Based on the observation that every neuron performs a rather
stereotypical computational operation on its input (Kandel et al.,
2013), it seems plausible that much more information processing
is actually going on inside the cell. After all, the neuron in itself is
an incredibly complex and morphologically diverse structure, of
which, despite all progress, we still have not reached a satisfactory
understanding. Incidentally, once we adopt such a perspective
we also no longer face the additional problem that changes in
synaptic conductance (i.e., modification of synaptic weights) are
actually not accessible to computational processes being carried
out inside the cell.
3.1. The View from Classical Cognitive
Science
Despite the fact that the information-processing approach to
the study of the mind/brain has gone somewhat out of fashion
within the cognitive sciences in the past decades, Gallistel and
King (2009) have presented a convincing argument for an
understanding of the mind/brain as being Turing complete. (In
this context, see Table 1 for working definitions of key terms.)
Needless to say, Gallistel and King’s original argument is by far
more detailed than the sketch that I can provide here, yet the
main points should surface and will hopefully suffice for further
treatment.
Once we reconsider the classical cognitive scientists’
conception of the mind/brain as a computational-
representational system it is evident that the brain must
adhere to the abstract architectural properties of a universal
Turing machine, meaning that it is capable of universal
computation. This, of course, is not to say that the brain
must resemble von Neumann’s implementation of a Turing
machine, but that it nevertheless seems to adhere to the abstract
properties of a Turing machine. Crucially, as David Marr put
it, “[v]iewing our brains as information-processing devices
is not demeaning [. . . ]” (Marr, 2010, p. 361). It might be the
case that the brain is capable of carrying out computations
that a Turing machine cannot compute, but we do not know
whether this is the case nor how the brain might achieve
this feat.
TABLE 1 | Nomenclature.
Term Exposition
Finite-state machine An abstract machine that can be in only one state at a
time and a finite number of states in total. Its memory is
defined by the number states available.
Turing machine A finite-state machine extended with a so-called tape.
The tape is a read/write memory component where
symbols can be stored and recovered.
Turing completeness Refers to the ability of a given set of instructions to
simulate a Turing machine.
von-Neumann
implementation
Denotes a common schematic circuit concept (and its
many offshoots) that actually implement a universal
Turing machine.
This table provides brief expositions of terms and concepts from theory of computation
that might not be familiar to all readers. Note that these are working definitions for the
purpose of this paper, they are not meant to be exhaustive.
Provided that the cognitive functions exhibited by human
brains require the capabilities of Turing machines, one could
quickly be led to a Scala Naturae interpretation of the evolution
of computational abilities of nervous systems. Humans seem to
be generalists, whereas animal learning is usually seen as highly
domain-specific (e.g., Gallistel, 1999). Thus, one might be led
to conclude that only human brains are capable of universal
computation. In fact, some have made this exact claim with
regard to human language capacities (e.g., Steedman, 2014).
However, this would clearly be a mistake, as it is now understood
that even insect navigation already requires the capabilities of
a Turing machine (Gallistel, 1998; Gallistel and King, 2009). In
other words, “[. . . ] ants have already climbed all the way up
Nature’s ladder.” (Berwick and Chomsky, 2016, p. 132)
The crucial feature of a Turing machine is its memory
component: the (hypothetical) machine must possess a
read/write memory in order to be vastly more capable than
a machine that remembers the past only by changing the
state of the processor, as does, for example, a finite-state
machine without read/write memory. Thus, there must
be an efficient way of storing symbols in memory (i.e.,
writing), locating symbols in memory (i.e., addressing), and
transporting symbols to the computational machinery (i.e.,
reading). It is exactly this problem, argue Gallistel and King
(2009), that has by and large been overlooked or ignored by
neuroscientists.
Now, when we are looking for a mechanism that implements
a read/write memory in the nervous system, looking at synaptic
strength and connectivity patterns might be misleading for
many reasons. Most pressingly, as Gallistel and King point out,
synapses might already be too complex in terms of implementing
such a very basic function:
In the final analysis, however, our skepticism rests most strongly
on the fact that the synapse is a circuit-level structure, a structure
that it takes two different neurons and a great many molecules
to realize. It seems to us likely for a variety of reasons that the
elementary unit in the memory mechanism will prove to be a
molecular or sub-molecular structural unit. (Gallistel and King,
2009, p. 282)
Hence, they suggest turning to DNA and RNA, which already
implement the functionality of a read/write memory at the
sub-molecular level. Interestingly, in discussing recent work
on memory, Poo et al. reach a similar conclusion when they
remark that “[. . . ] some other mechanisms, potentially involving
epigenomic modifications in engram neurons, appear to be
necessary for memory trace storage” (Poo et al., 2016, p. 8).
A mechanism as essential as memory has to be efficient
in all respects, be it implementational complexity or energy
efficiency. Another part of Gallistel and collaborators’ argument
for the point of view they put forward is the observation that
neural computation is demonstrably incredibly fast, therefore
making it much more likely that the memory mechanism is
(sub-)molecular in nature so that computational machinery
and memory can be located in close physical proximity in
order to minimize the distance over which a signal has to
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be transmitted (a process which evidently is “slow” in the
nervous system in comparison to, for example, conventional
computers).
3.2. Some Tentative Evidence
To this day, tentative evidence for the (classical) cognitive
scientists’ reservations toward the synapse as the locus of
memory in the brain has accumulated. A lot of groundbreaking
work concerning the way in which the brain carries forward
information in time was actually performed on comparatively
simple model organisms such as Aplysia and has then been
extrapolated to speculate about what might be going on in human
mind/brains (e.g., Kandel and Siegelbaum, 2013). Interestingly, it
is recent work in this exact domain which has indicated that the
idea of synaptic conductance as the basic memory mechanism is
insufficient and incomplete at best.
In Kandel and collaborators’ by now classic work with Aplysia,
changes in synaptic conductivity were shown to alter how the
animal reflexively responds to its environment. But not even
in Aplysia all synapses are equally susceptible to change, many
appeared not to be very plastic (Kandel and Siegelbaum, 2013).
Recent work with cultured Aplysia motor and sensory neurons
by Chen et al. (2014) has revealed that long-term memories
appear to persist covertly in cell bodies and can be restored after
synapses have been eliminated. Long-term memory persisted
after pharmacological elimination of synapses that had been
produced only after learning had occurred, calling the role of
synapses as the presumed locus of memory into serious doubt.
Similarly and possibly even more convincing, in a
groundbreaking study bulding on earlier work (Hesslow
et al., 2013) that already pointed to the mismatch between
LTD in Purkinje cells and cerebellar learning, Johansson et al.
(2014) investigated how the response of Purkinje cells changes
during learning. Studying eyeblink conditioning, they showed
that the cells could learn the temporal relationship between
paired stimuli during conditioning. Strikingly and in stark
contrast to widespread belief, the timing of responses exhibited
by conditioned Purkinje cells after conditioning did not depend
on a temporally patterned input. Consequently, Johansson et al.
conclude that both, timing mechanism and memory trace, are
located within the Purkinje cell itself. As they put it, “[. . . ] the
data strongly suggest that the main timing mechanism is within
the Purkinje cell and that its nature is cellular rather than a
network property” (Johansson et al., 2014, p. 14933).
Lastly, in a recent study supposed to demonstrate the
increase in synaptic strength and density of dendritic spines
during memory consoldiation, Ryan et al. (2015), to their own
surprise, showed that changes in synaptic strength are not
directly related to storage of new information in memory. In
accordance with the literature on memory consolidation, Ryan
et al. found that injection of protein synthesis inhibitors induced
retrograde amnesia, meaning that the memory could not be
retrieved. However, when optogenetically activating the neurons
previously tagged during the conditioning process, memories
could nevertheless be retrieved despite chemical blocking,
indicating that the formation of synapses or strengthening of
synaptic weights is not critical to memory formation as such.
3.3. Rate of Synaptic Turnover
The synaptic trace theory of memory requires synaptic
conductance and connectivity to change during learning, that is
when new information is being memorized. Studies by Xu et al.
(2009) and Yang et al. (2009) both used two-photon microscopy,
a feat of contemporary technology that makes it possible to trace
individual synaptic spines over prolonged periods of time (i.e.,
weeks to months), in order to investigate the predicted changes
in motor cortex during acquisition of a new motor skill.
As the researchers had anticipated, they found that learning of
the new motor skill indeed was accompanied by the formation of
new synaptic connections. Yet, the more puzzling finding of their
studies is that synaptic spines were found to be still turning over
at a rather high rate in absence of learning. As a matter of fact, the
rate of synaptic turnover in absence of learning is actually so high
that the newly formed connections (which supposedly encode the
newmemory) will have vanished in due time. It is worth noticing
that these findings actually are to be expected when considering
that synapses are made of proteins which are generally known to
have a short lifetime.
Nevertheless, the observation that synapses are turning over at
a high rate even in absence of learning, of course, is paradoxical.
Interestingly, this was already noticed by A. von Kölliker, a
contemporary of Ramón y Cajal (see Delgado-García, 2015).
Today, Bizzi and Ajemian observe as an aside in a review of the
current state of research on voluntary movement:
If we believe that memories are made of patterns of synaptic
connections sculpted by experience, and if we know, behaviorally,
that motor memories last a lifetime, then how can we explain the
fact that individual synaptic spines are constantly turning over
and that aggregate synaptic strengths are constantly fluctuating?
(Bizzi and Ajemian, 2015, p. 91)
Just as Bizzi and Ajemian go on to describe, this finding is
amongst those that are the most challenging to the idea that the
synapse is the locus of memory in the brain.
Synapses have been found to be constantly turning over
in all parts of cortex that have been examined using two-
photon microscopy so far (see papers cited in Yang et al., 2009),
meaning that (motor) memories by far outlive their supposed
constituent parts. It seems that there are two possible ways
of resolving this puzzle: We can either assume that memories
are perpetually being retrieved from memory and re-encoded
during this constant turnover, or we might conclude that the
widely presumed relation between synaptic conductance and
connectivity andmemory is not as direct as conventional wisdom
would have it. Provided that there is some merit to the idea
that brain’s memory mechanism might be localized to neurons’
somata, a separation between learning and memory seems
indicated.
4. THE NEED TO SEPARATE LEARNING
AND MEMORY
That learning and memory might be dissociated has been
implicitly acknowledged in the neuroscience literature (e.g.,
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Bannerman et al., 1995; Saucier and Cain, 1995). The word
has not (yet) spread to other disciplines, presumably because
experimental results have, to a certain extent, been somewhat
ambiguous (Martin and Morris, 2002). Consequently, these
reported tentative findings are usually not readily interpreted
as evidence countering the idea of associative LTP/LTD as the
putative basis for learning and memory.
A good example is spatial learning which is crucially
dependent on hippocampus (Bannerman et al., 1995; Martin and
Morris, 2002). Without going into great detail here, it can be said
that the production of LTP (though not its maintenance) has been
shown to crucially depend on N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)
receptors located in the dentritic spine of the postsynaptic neuron
(Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2007; Siegelbaum et al., 2013). It thus
follows that if these receptors are chemically blocked, learning
should be impaired or rendered impossible. Indeed, animals
with blocked LTP exhibit impairment of their ability for spatial
learning. But this general statement requires some qualifications
as Bannerman et al. (1995) as well as Saucier and Cain (1995)
have shown that pretraining can actually “compensate” for
pharmacological blocking of NDMA receptors so that animals
perform (close to) normal.
Otherwise put, when animals were pretrained in navigating
in one water maze they could readily learn to navigate in a
second one despite the chemical blocking of LTP. This might be
interpreted as to indicate that NMDA receptors do play a role in
initial learning of a new skill (i.e., navigating a maze) but do not
appear to play any role in altering the specifics, or maybe better
“contents.” for example, when a new map is added to memory,
respectively when the already existing representation is being
updated. Provided that blocking of NMDA receptors did not
prevent the acquisition of new information it seems reasonable to
purport that a memory mechanism other than LTP was at work
here, though the nature of this mechanism remains unknown.
All in all, we might take this as an indication for a dissociation
of (spatial) learning and the memory mechanism(s) as such, an
interpretation that has abundant representational implications
(see also Gallistel and Matzel, 2013).
We might now once again turn to (classical) cognitive
science and consider these findings against the backdrop that
learning is highly domain-specific (e.g., Chomsky, 1975; Gallistel,
1999): An information-processing perspective on the mind/brain
necessarily leads to the postulation of domain-specific learning
mechanisms. Hence, based on the above-mentioned studies we
might postulate that the (spatial) learning mechanism is only
partially dependent on synaptic plasticity. Acquisition of the
skill relies on synaptic plasticity and thus a process of neural
reorganization, whereas altering the specifics (i.e., acquisition of
new information, respectively “updating” of information already
stored inmemory) does not. It follows that LTP and thus synaptic
plasticity cannot provide the brain’s basic memory mechanism.
In the sense of Gallistel and King (2009), learning is the
process of extracting information from the environment, whereas
memorizing is the processes of storing this information in a
manner that is accessible to computation. It is interesting to
note that once learning and memory are conceived of as separate
processes, the above-mentioned observation that synaptic spines
are still turning over at a very high rate in absence of learning
does no longer pose such a severe problem. In somewhat similar
fashion, we can interpret the findings of Ryan et al. (2015)
against this background, so that we might say that in their study
information was extracted from the environment (i.e., learning
occurred) and stored in memory independently of the process of
memory consolidation, that is alteration of synaptic weights and
connectivity.
Lastly, all of this is not to say that synaptic plasticity and
networks are of no importance for learning and memory.
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) already reviewed the implications
of connectionist models, concluding that connectionism might
best be understood as a neutral “theory of implementation”
of the actual cognitive architecture, provided that one
gives up anti-representational tendencies inherent to the
approach. As a consequence, the question no longer is
whether symbolic representations are “real,” but how (i.e.,
on what level) they are actually implemented in the brain.
The challenge for critics of the synaptic plasticity hypothesis
will therefore be to come up with concrete suggestions for
how memory might be implemented on the sub-cellular level
and how cells then relate to the networks in which they are
embedded.
5. RETHINKING SYNAPTIC PLASTICITY
The realization that the synapse is probably an ill fit when looking
for a basic memory mechanism in the nervous system does
not entail that synaptic plasticity should be deemed irrelevant.
Quite to the contrary, there of course is ample and convincing
evidence that synaptic plasticity is a prerequisite for many forms
of learning (see e.g., Martin and Morris, 2002; Münte et al., 2002;
Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2007; Jäncke, 2009; Dudai et al., 2015;
Ryan et al., 2015; Poo et al., 2016). However, it occurs to me that
we should seriously consider the possibility that the observable
changes in synaptic weights and connectivity might not so much
constitute the very basis of learning as they are the result of
learning.
This is to say that once we accept the conjecture of Gallistel
and collaborators that the study of learning can and should be
separated from the study of memory to a certain extent, we can
reinterpret synaptic plasticity as the brain’s way of ensuring a
connectivity and activity pattern that is efficient and appropriate
to environmental and internal requirements within physical
and developmental constraints. Consequently, synaptic plasticity
might be understood as a means of regulating behavior (i.e.,
activity and connectivity patterns) only after learning has already
occurred. In other words, synaptic weights and connections are
altered after relevant information has already been extracted from
the environment and stored in memory.
Over roughly the last decade, evidence that supports such an
interpretation has been piling up, suggesting that the brain is
(close to) “optimally wired.” It seems that axons and dendrites
are close to the smallest possible length, at least within a cortical
column (Chklovskii et al., 2002; Chklovskii, 2004) and possibly
also globally (Cherniak et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2012; Sporns,
2012). As noted by Chklovskii et al., this “optimality” has further
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pressing implications for the idea that the synapse is the locus of
memory, after all,
[. . .] an increased number of synapses could not be
accommodated without degrading performance in some
way because the cortex is already optimally wired in the sense
that the number of synapses is already maximal (Chklovskii et al.,
2002, p. 345).
The role of synaptic plasticity thus changes from providing the
fundamental memory mechanism to providing the brain’s way of
ensuring that its wiring diagram enables it to operate efficiently
with regard to environmental and internal pressures. Viewed
against the background that synapses are practically unfit to
implement the cognitive scientists’ beloved symbols, it seems that
we seriously have to consider that synaptic plasticity might not
implement a memory mechanism as such. Instead, changes in
synaptic conductance and connectivity might provide a bundle
of mechanisms which regulate and ensure that the network and
its modules perform and interact efficiently.
In this regard, it is vital to note that while cognitive science
tells us that learning is domain-specific, these observations
unfortunately cannot tell us whether the basic memory
mechanism is rather uniform or not. An evolutionary argument
could be put forward in favor of a view where the basic memory
mechanisms is highly conserved, but such a theory has not yet
been confirmed to facts. If memory actually turns out to be sub-
cellular in nature, synaptic plasticity would of course not be
rendered irrelevant. However, what would change is the function
commonly attributed to synapses: For example, one possibility is
that synapses could be understood as providing “access points” to
information already stored in memory inside the cell (Ryan et al.,
2015), instead of a way of carrying forward information in time.
Memories stored in cells could thus possibly be considered to be
synapse-specific, meaning that activating different synapses will
elicit different events in the cell.
6. A TENTATIVE OUTLOOK
To sum up, it can be said that when it comes to answering
the question of how information is carried forward in time
in the brain we remain largely clueless. Fittingly, in a recent
autobiographical account of his research, scientific career, and
personal life, Michael Gazzaniga commented on the current
problems of (cognitive) neuroscience, concluding that “[. . . ]
neuroscience still has not collected the key data because, to some
extent, it is not known what that key data even is” (Gazzaniga,
2015, p. 190).
Apparently, very much as Marr (2010) envisioned, the
“classical” cognitive scientists’ analysis of the information-
processing problem at stake in the study of memory now has
yielded first hints with regard to where neurobiologists should be
looking for this key data when studying the brain’s fundamental
memory mechanism(s): inside the cell. Tentative evidence from
a wide variety of work in neuroscience seems to provide support
for the idea that the synapse is an ill fit when looking for
the brain’s basic memory mechanism: memory persists despite
synapses having been destroyed and synapses are turning over at
very high rates even when nothing is being learned. All things
considered, the case against synaptic plasticity is convincing, but
it should be emphasized that we are currently also still lacking a
coherent alternative.
Adolphs (2015) optimistically listed the problem of how
learning and memory work among those that he expects to be
solved by neuroscientists within the next 50 years. We shall see
how this turns out, but, if anything, the evidence and recent
findings discussed here seem to indicate tome that we will have to
rethink many of the basic propositions in the cognitive sciences
and especially neuroscience in order to actually achieve this. Yet,
it is not at all implausible that in the years to come we might
see the paradigm shift that Gallistel and Balsam (2014) have been
calling for.
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